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Abstract. We study the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma and the
snowdrift game on scale-free networks that are subjected to intentional and random
removal of vertices. We show that, irrespective of the game type, cooperation on scale-
free networks is extremely robust against random deletion of vertices, but declines fast if
vertices with the maximal degree are targeted. In particular, attack tolerance is lowest
if the temptation to defect is largest, whereby a small fraction of removed vertices
suffices to decimate cooperators. The decline of cooperation can be directly linked to
the decrease of heterogeneity of scale-free networks that sets in due to the removal of
high degree vertices. We conclude that the evolution of cooperation is characterized by
similar attack and error tolerance as was previously reported for information readiness
and spread of viruses on scale-free networks.
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Social dilemmas emerge if individual success calls for actions that harm collective
wellbeing. While cooperation is widely accepted as the rational strategy leading away
from the impeding decline, its evolution in groups of selfish individuals is puzzling [1].
Evolutionary game theory is frequently used as the framework within which answers to
the puzzle are sought [2]. The pivotal study that launched a spree of activity aimed
towards resolving dilemmas of cooperation in evolutionary games is due to Nowak
and May [3], who showed that spatial structure may, unlike well mixed populations,
maintain cooperative behavior in the prisoner’s dilemma game. However, it has also
been reported that spatial structure may inhibit cooperation in the snowdrift game [4],
and thus the need for finding a unifying mechanism supporting the cooperative strategy
was revitalized. Quite remarkably, scale-free networks [5] turned out to be the missing
link to cooperation by virtually all main social dilemmas [6, 7], owning predominantly to
the heterogeneity that characterizes their degree distribution. Although several studies
have since elaborated on different aspects of cooperation on scale-free networks, as for
example dynamical organization [8, 9], clustering [10] and mixing patterns [11], as well
as memory [12], robustness [13] and payoff normalization [14, 15, 16], open questions
still remain. Notably, the promotive impact of heterogeneous states on the evolution
of cooperation has been reported also in other contexts [17, 18, 19], and coevolutionary
rules have been introduced that may generate appropriate heterogeneities spontaneously
[20, 21, 22, 23, 24].
Importantly though, complex networks received outstanding attention already
substantially before above findings were published [25, 26, 27], and indeed, it can be
stated that evolutionary games, apart from some notable exceptions [28, 29, 30], were
actually late in getting on board. For a comprehensive review see [31]. A particular
aspect of studies concerning scale-free and related complex networks, that is of great
relevance for the present work, is their tolerance to attack and error [32], upon which
relies fast availability of information within the world-wide-web [33], uninterrupted
supply with electricity [34], fast spread of epidemics and viral infections [35, 36, 37, 38],
robust and near flawless reproduction of organisms [39], and surely many other aspects
of everyday life. Evidently, some of these features are very desirable, while others we
would be better off without. Remarkable is that the deletion of high degree vertices,
constituting an intentional attack on the network, severely impairs all these processes,
whereas random vertex removals, constituting what can be interpreted as errors in
communication pathways across the network, leave them practically unaffected. Due
to the obvious importance of the subject, several studies elaborated on the resilience of
complex networks also analytically via the usage of percolation theory [40, 41, 42, 43].
Aim of the presented work is to show that the evolution of cooperation on scale-
free networks obeys to similar laws as mentioned above, in that the removal of high
degree vertices rapidly decimates the density of cooperators, whereas random deletion
has a completely negligible impact. More precisely, we report that the impact of
attack depends significantly on the temptation to defect, whereas errors go by unnoticed
irrespective of game parametrization. We will also show that these results can be directly
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attributed to the rapid decrease of degree heterogeneity following an intentional attack
on the scale-free network, and the lack thereof in case of random errors. The study
thus supplements previous works examining the evolution of cooperation on scale-free
networks, and more importantly, intimately links the process of strategy evolution in
terms of error and attack tolerance to earlier studies on epidemic spread and information
propagation.
In what follows, both the prisoner’s dilemma game as well as the snowdrift game
will be used as representative examples of social dilemmas, whereby we adopt the same
parametrization as used recently in [6]. Accordingly, the prisoner’s dilemma game is
characterized by the temptation to defect T = b, reward for mutual cooperation R = 1,
and punishment P as well as the suckers payoff S equaling 0, whereby 1 < b ≤ 2 ensures a
proper payoff ranking [3]. The snowdrift game, on the other hand, has T = β, R = β−½,
S = β − 1 and P = 0, where the temptation to defect can be expressed in terms of the
cost-to-benefit ratio r = 1/(2β − 1) with 0 ≤ r ≤ 1. In both games two cooperators
facing one another acquire R, two defectors get P , whereas a cooperator receives S if
facing a defector who then gains T . Initially, each player x on the network is designated
either as a cooperator (C) or defector (D) with equal probability. Irrespective of the
game, evolution of the two strategies is performed in accordance with the Monte Carlo
simulation procedure comprising the following elementary steps. First, a randomly
selected player x acquires its payoff px by playing the game with all its kx neighbors.
Next, one randomly chosen neighbor of x, denoted by y, also acquires its payoff py by
playing the game with all its ky neighbors. Last, if px > py player x tries to enforce its
strategy sx on player y in accordance with the probability W (sx → sy) = (px− py)/bkq,
where kq is the largest of the two degrees kx and ky. In accordance with the random
sequential update, each player is selected once on average during a full Monte Carlo
step.
As the underlying interaction topology we use scale-free networks generated via
growth and preferential attachment as proposed by Baraba´si and Albert [5], whereby
each vertex corresponds to a particular player x. The generation of the network starts
with two connected players, and subsequently every new player is attached to two old
players already present in the network, whereby the probability Π that a new player
will be connected to an old player x depends on its degree kx in accordance with
Π = kx/
∑
ky. This growth and preferential attachment scheme yields a network with
an average degree κ = (1/N)
∑
kx of four, and a power-law degree distribution with
the slope of the line equaling −2.9 on a double logarithmic graph. Notably, analytical
estimations predict the slope of the line to equal −3 [5].Below we will study the evolution
of cooperation in dependence on the fraction of deleted vertices Λ = η/N , where η is the
number of deletions to be made and N is the original size of the network. As noted, two
procedures for the removal of vertices will be considered. During the first, all η vertices
to be deleted are selected randomly from the network. The second is more deliberate,
in that we always look for the vertex with the largest degree within the network and
remove it. This is done in a consecutive manner until η vertices, each having the largest
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degree within the network at the time of removal, are deleted. The two procedures
correspond to error and attack, respectively, as argued in [32]. Notably, some players
that are not selected for deletion may become disconnected from the network during
either of the two procedures since removing a vertex entails deleting all its links as
well. Such disconnected players are also removed as soon as they appear, but do not
contribute to η. Note here that completely isolated players cannot have an impact on
the evolution of cooperation because at least one partner is needed with whom the
game can be played. We will also be interested in quantifying the degree heterogeneity
of networks obtained by different Λ, which can be realized succinctly by calculating the
degree variance χ = (̺−κ2)/κ, where ̺ is the average of the square of all kx (note that
here κ and ̺ are evaluated by taking into account only the N − η remaining vertices by
a given Λ).
Presented results were obtained on networks hosting N = 5000 players by
Λ = 0. Equilibrium fractions of cooperators ρC were determined within 10
6 full
Monte Carlo steps after sufficiently long transients were discarded. Importantly, since
the generation of scale-free networks has inherent random ingredients, which can be
additionally amplified by vertex deletions, final results shown below were averaged over
200 independent runs for each set of parameter values to warrant appropriate accuracy.
Next, we will systematically analyze the impact of error and attack on the evolution
of cooperation, whereby results for the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game will be
shown and commented in a parallel fashion for the purpose of better comparison options.
Upper two panels of Fig. 1 depict the effect of error on the evolution of cooperation within
the prisoner’s dilemma game (left) and the snowdrift game (right). Irrespective of Λ, the
dependence of ρC on different levels of error-affected vertices is negligible by both game
types. In fact, it is practically impossible to distinguish the evolution of cooperation
on a perfectly functioning scale-free network from the evolution of cooperation taking
place on a scale-free network that is prone to error, even if up to 6% of randomly
selected vertices become completely dysfunctional (are deleted along with all their links).
This changes rather dramatically if, instead of randomly selected vertices, the targeted
vertices become those with the largest degree within the network. Lower two panels of
Fig. 1 depict the effect of attack on the evolution of cooperation within the prisoner’s
dilemma game (left) and the snowdrift game (right). By the prisoner’s dilemma game the
fraction of cooperators decreases steadily as Λ increases, albeit the rate of the decrease
differs substantially in dependence on b. On the other hand, the detrimental impact on
ρC by the snowdrift game is virtually absent for r < 0.36, and even seems to reverse
slightly until r < 0.65, yet towards the r = 1 limit cooperators are, similarly as by
the prisoner’s dilemma game, decimated heavily by as low as 3% of deleted high degree
vertices.
In order to present the impact of attack in both games more deliberately, we show
in Fig. 2 the relative decrease of cooperator density ∆ρC (with respect to the Λ = 0
case) by representative values of b and r. Left panel of Fig. 2 depicts results for the
prisoner’s dilemma game. As could be inferred already from the bottom left panel of
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Figure 1. Gray-scale maps of ρC in dependence on b (left column; prisoner’s dilemma
game) and r (right column; snowdrift game) by different Λ. Top two panels show
results for random removal of vertices, whereas bottom two panels depict the impact
of attack. Shading in all panels is linear, black depicting ρC = 0.1 and white showing
ρC = 1.0 with 20 steps between the two. In order to strengthen the resilience of ρC on
error in scale-free networks, the span of Λ in the upper two panels is two times larger
than in the bottom two panels.
Fig. 1, the relative decrease in dependence on Λ increases fast as b increases, and indeed,
by b = 2 as much as 87% of cooperators present at Λ = 0 are replaced by defectors
at Λ = 0.03 (equivalently η = 150 if N = 5000). Conversely, by lower values of b the
impact of attack may be less devastating, but only if Λ remains small. Note that by
a substantial deletion of high degree vertices the network approaches a regular graph,
and the sustenance of cooperation thus becomes impaired even by low b. Results for
the snowdrift game, presented in the right panel of Fig. 2, are largely in agreement
with the above interpretation. Differently is, as noticed already by the examination of
the bottom right panel of Fig. 1, that for r = 0.46 and r = 0.64 a slight increase in
∆ρC can be inferred by intermediate η. However, this effect is practically negligible if
compared to the subsequent downward trend, and it may be attributed to the differences
in the microscopic dynamics of strategy adoptions between the prisoner’s dilemma and
the snowdrift game, as recently argued in [4]. Thus, irrespective of the type of the
game, the impact of deliberate vertex deletions becomes increasingly pronounced by
high temptations to defect, where as low as 3% of removed influential players suffice to
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Figure 2. Decrease of ∆ρC (relative to the Λ = 0 case) in dependence on η for
different values of b (left; prisoner’s dilemma game) and r (right; snowdrift game) due
to intentional attack. Note that the horizontal axis displays η+1 so that the reference
value can also by displayed on a log scale. Lines are just to guide the eye.
heavily impair the evolution of cooperation.
Above outlined results, presenting the impact of error and attack on the evolution of
cooperation, can be explained by studying the resulting degree heterogeneity of networks
by different values of Λ. The outstanding importance of heterogeneity for maintaining
cooperative behavior has been described in [6], where it has been argued that cooperators
may benefit substantially from occupying the hubs of the network, and as doing so spread
their strategy effectively. Conversely, defectors are unable to claim lasting benefits
from occupying the hubs, simply because they become very weak as soon as all the
neighbors of the defecting hub become defectors themselves. At this point influential
defectors occupying the hubs become vulnerable and are easily overtaken by cooperators.
Similar mechanisms for promotion of cooperation have recently been proposed also for
games on regular graphs, where the heterogeneity was introduced via random quenched
evolutionary landscapes [18] or differences in the reproduction capability of players [22].
In these studies it has been shown that as the heterogeneity in the system decreases so
does the density of cooperators. Here we quantify heterogeneity by calculating the degree
variance χ of networks in dependence on Λ separately for error and attack. Figure 3
shows the relative (with respect to Λ = 0 case) decrease of degree variance ∆χ for error
(black squares) and attack (red circles). It can be observed that random deletions of
vertices have practically no impact on the heterogeneity of resulting networks, whereas
attack, on the other hand, decreases the degree heterogeneity in a power-law fashion.
In accordance with the previously described impact of heterogeneity on the evolution
of cooperation [6, 18, 22, 44], we argue that the two depicted dependencies of ∆χ on
Λ in Fig. 3 are responsible for both, the supreme tolerance of cooperation on error, as
well as its fragility on attack by high temptations to defect. Importantly, however, the
decay of cooperation can also be linked to the critical fraction of removed vertices that is
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Figure 3. Decrease of ∆χ (relative to the Λ = 0 case) in dependence on η by error
(black squares) and attack (red circles) of scale-free networks. The vertical line (dashed
blue) denotes the critical number of removed vertices needed for the disintegration of
the considered scale-free network into isolated components [42]. Note that both axes
have a logarithmic scale. Lines connecting the symbols are just to guide the eye.
needed for the scale-free network to disintegrate into isolated components. Following the
works of Cohen et al. [40, 42] based on percolation theory, the critical fraction Λc can be
estimated analytically [see Eqs. (7) and (9) in Ref. 42], in particular Λc = 0.028±0.002.
In Fig. 3 the dashed blue vertical line denotes the value of η corresponding to Λc, and
indeed, it can be inferred that the critical value for network fragmentation agrees well
with the maximal decay of cooperation by high temptations to defect (see b = 2.0
and r = 1.0 results presented in Fig. 2; note also the saturation of the decay when
approaching Λc). Thus, we conclude that the threshold for network fragmentation can
be used as a good estimate for the tolerance of cooperation on scale-free networks subject
to attack, and moreover, that the transition to defector dominance can in fact be related
to network fragmentation into isolated components.
In sum, we have elaborated on the tolerance of cooperation evolution in the
prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game on scale-free networks subject to error
and attack. We show that, irrespective of the game type, cooperation on scale-free
networks is extremely robust against random deletion of vertices, but declines fast
upon attack in environments prone to defection. These two facts are attributed to
the impact of vertex deletion on the degree heterogeneity of resulting networks, which
is unaffected by error but decreases fast in case of attack. Moreover, we were able to
link the decay of cooperators with the critical fraction of intentionally removed vertices
that is needed for the scale-free network to disintegrate into isolated components, thus
coupling our findings with previous considerations of percolation theory upon deliberate
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attack [42]. Presented results support the claim that the evolution of cooperation by
high temptations to defect is characterized by the same faint attack tolerance as was
previously reported for several other processes on scale-free networks, as for example
spread of viral diseases or the effectiveness of information retrieval (for a review see
[26]). However, by small temptations to defect, the damage on cooperation imposed
by attacks is limited due to the fact that heterogeneity is then not of vital importance
for the survival of cooperators, as exemplified already in the seminal work concerning
games on regular grids [3]. From the perspective of experiences we have from real life,
the study offers a nice view on why influential individuals, such as kings in the past or
presidents and other high ranking sanctioners at present, should be granted the amenities
that uphold high levels of their personal security. The fragile tolerance of cooperation,
especially in environments that incline individuals towards defective behavior, indicates
that such measure are indeed reasonable, and might have an evolutionary origin of which
roots can be traced back to the very beginnings of civilization.
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